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STATE EMPLOYER SANCTIONS LAWS
AND THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE:
THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS
ACT REVISITED
Nchimunya D. Ndulo*
As the desire to seize upon employment opportunities within the
United States persists, illegal immigration continues to rise. Some states
are disproportionately affected by this phenomenon, and as a result,
frustration continues to mount in response to what is perceived as an
ineffective attempt by the federal government to regulate illegal immi-
gration. This frustration often manifests itself in states attempting to en-
act more stringent immigration laws. This Note discusses Arizona's
recently enacted state sanctions law, the Legal Arizona Workers Act,
currently considered the toughest state employer sanctions law in the
country. The law punishes employers who knowingly or intentionally
employ illegal immigrants. The law's focus on the employment of illegal
immigrants raises federal preemption concerns as the law potentially in-
fringes upon the federal immigration power. Through its analysis, this
Note discusses the federal preemption doctrine and its roots, and how it
relates to the litigious challenges to the Arizona statute. While address-
ing the arguments presented by states for the unilateral enactment of
state immigration laws, the Note discusses the historical consensus on
the exclusive federal power over immigration legislation. This consensus
is expressed in constitutional considerations and precedent, and rein-
forced by the need for uniform immigration laws. In light of this consen-
sus, through an analysis of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit's recent holding which upheld the validity of the Arizona
statute under a federal preemption analysis, this Note concurs that the
substantive prohibitions and the penalties imposed for violating the Le-
gal Arizona Workers Act are not preempted on the grounds of either
express preemption or implied field preemption. However, this Note ar-
gues, contrary to the court's holding, that the required use of E-Verify
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under the Legal Arizona Workers Act should have been preempted on the
grounds of implied conflict preemption.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, "the holes in
the United States's immigration system became painfully apparent"'
when Americans came face to face with terrorist acts perpetrated by for-
eigners. Fears intensified with isolated regional events such as the
Washington, D.C., sniper attacks in 2002, where authorities found one of
the attackers to be an illegal alien from Jamaica, 2 and the gang-rape and
murder of a woman in New York by illegal aliens in 2004.3 In response,
I See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and
the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CrN. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2006).
2 See Susan Kelleher, Judge Orders Deportation Of Malvo's Mother, PT-rSBURGH POST-
GAZETrE, Nov. 21, 2002, at A8.
3 James Gordon Meek, City: Cops Stymied by Feds: Illegal-Alien Arrests Go Nowhere,
DAILy NEWS (N.Y), Feb. 28, 2003, at 14.
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the federal government began to make a concerted effort to involve local
authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. With a lim-
ited force of approximately 2,000 immigration investigators, 4 and the
number of illegal immigrants outnumbering federal agents 5,000 to 1,5
the use of state enforcement was seen as essential to the efficient and
effective enforcement of federal immigration laws. 6
Consequently, federal government agencies and officials expressed
the need for state participation in the enforcement of federal immigration
laws. Then-United States Attorney General John Ashcroft and other De-
partment of Justice officials encouraged local governments to enforce
immigration laws as part of their anti-terrorism mission. 7 Additionally,
following the events of September 1 1th, Congress drafted legislation
such as the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act
(CLEAR Act), which would have financially rewarded local govern-
ments willing to enforce immigration laws. 8 Although the CLEAR Act
did not pass, some of its core provisions continue to resurface in legisla-
tion pending in Congress. 9
The reactions of states to the federal government's efforts can be
divided into two camps.' 0 In the first camp are states that have adopted
non-cooperation laws in response to the more stringent federal immigra-
tion laws following September 11 th.II These non-cooperation laws were
prompted by the thought of having to extend limited state resources to
include immigration enforcement procedures and by a fear of the effect
tighter immigration regulation might have on long-term public develop-
ment. 1 2 These laws have taken many forms. For example, some laws
prohibit actions by state law enforcement officers that would comply
with federal immigration laws,13 while other state non-cooperation laws
4 Daniel Booth, Note, Federalism on Ice: State and Local Enforcement of Federal Im-
migration Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1063, 1065 (2006)
5 Id. at 1066 (citing 151 CONG. REc. S7853 (daily ed. June 30, 2005)).
6 See id. (citing 151 CONG. REc. S7853 (daily ed. June 30, 2005)).
7 Pham, supra note 1, at 1374, 1386.
8 Id. at 1387.
9 Id.
10 See id. at 1374 ("While some local governments enthusiastically embraced the oppor-
tunity to enforce immigration laws [at the encouragement of the federal government], others
refused to become involved ....").
11 Id. at 1387-91 (discussing the form and substantive provisions of state non-coopera-
tion laws).
12 See id. at 1375.
13 See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4.18.015 (A) (2003), available at
http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/-public/codel .htm (search "Code Section Number" for "4.18.015";
then follow "Inquiries into immigration status" hyperlink) ("[Ulnless otherwise required by
law or by court order, no Seattle City officer or employee shall inquire into the immigration
status of any person, or engage in activities designed to ascertain the immigration status of any
person.").
2009]
852 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:849
prohibit the use of state resources by state agencies to enforce federal
immigration laws.' 4
In contrast, in the second camp are states that have seen the alleged
involvement of illegal immigrants in criminal acts as an opportunity to
advocate for more stringent independent state immigration laws.15 These
states are frustrated by what they perceive to be the ineffective enforce-
ment of immigration laws at the federal level and have seized upon the
opportunity to curb illegal immigration within their own states.16 Some
of these states have resorted to the enactment of more stringent immigra-
tion laws, employing methods such as employer sanctions. 17 One such
state is the state of Arizona.
In 2007, Arizona adopted the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA),
which prohibits the knowing or intentional employment of illegal immi-
grants.' 8 LAWA resulted from the state's frustration with ineffective
federal attempts to curb illegal immigration. 19 However, the new Ari-
zona sanctions law was strongly opposed by local businessmen and wo-
men who filed suit against the state's county attorneys.20 LAWA's
challengers filed suit in federal district court, 2t and subsequently ap-
pealed the district court's ruling to the Ninth Circuit.22 They are cur-
14 See, e.g., Alaska H.R.J. Res. 22, 23d Legis. (May 2003), available at http://www.
legis.state.ak.us/basis/getbilljext.asp?hsid=HJR022D&session=23 (last visited May 22,
2009) ("[A]n agency or instrumentality of the state may not ... use state resources or institu-
tions for the enforcement of federal immigration matters, which are the responsibility of the
federal government ....").
15 See PBS, Pennsylvania Town Passes Illegal Immigration Law, Sept. 1, 2006, http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/social issues/july-dec06/imrnigration_09-01 .html (last visited May
22, 2009) (discussing the mayor of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, Lou Barletta's concern over the
involvement of illegal aliens in local criminal activity as a trigger for advocating for Hazle-
ton's immigration ordinance).
16 See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Governor Signs Tough Bill on Hiring Illegal
Immigrants, N.Y. TiMEs, July 3, 2007, at Al0.
17 See, e.g., id.; Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (over-
turning an ordinance enacted in the town of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, that regulated the rental
of housing to and employment of undocumented aliens, and imposed penalties on violators,
including sanctions).
18 See 2007 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 279 (West) (codified at ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-
212-23-214 (2008)); see also Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Laws Governing the Legal
Arizona Workers Act, http://www.maricopacountyattomey.org/lawa/statutes.html (last visited
May 22, 2009).
19 See Archibold, supra note 16, at AI0 (discussing then-Governor of Arizona Janet
Napolitano's frustration regarding Congress' attempt to curb illegal immigration as a reason to
move forward with the Legal Arizona Workers Act's enactment).
20 See Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Chronology of Litigation Challenging the
Legal Arizona Workers Act, http://www.maricopacountyattorney.org/lawa/litigation.html (last
visited May 22, 2009) (providing a chronology of the litigation challenging LAWA).
21 See generally Arizona Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036,
1043 (D. Ariz. 2008).
22 See generally Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866-67 (9th
Cir. 2009).
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rently seeking the review of the Supreme Court over the Ninth Circuit's
holding.23 In their lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that LAWA violated
many federal and state constitutional provisions: the Commerce Clause,
the Supremacy Clause, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution; the procedural due process clauses of the federal and Ari-
zona constitutions; and the separation of powers doctrine of the Arizona
Constitution.24 However, the focus of the plaintiffs' suit was the claim
that federal immigration law preempted LAWA. 25
This Note addresses the law's validity under the doctrine of federal
preemption. It argues that the substantive prohibitions under LAWA, and
the penalties imposed for the violation thereof, are not preempted by fed-
eral legislation on the grounds of either express preemption or implied
field preemption, as contested by the complainants, because LAWA reg-
ulates a field consistently and solely regulated by state governments and
not prohibited by the language of current federal immigration legislation.
However, this Note argues that federal law does preempt LAWA's re-
quired use of E-Verify 26 on the grounds of implied conflict preemption
because it conflicts with the congressional intent and objective to make
the program voluntary.
In arriving at this conclusion, Part I of this Note discusses the Ari-
zona statute, its roots, and its implications in the context of similar state
employer sanctions laws. Part II discusses the doctrine of federal pre-
emption and its sources. An application of this doctrine follows in Parts
III and IV. More specifically, Part Ill applies an express preemption
analysis to the substantive prohibitions and the penalties imposed under
the statute. Part IV applies an implied field preemption analysis to the
substantive prohibitions and penalties imposed under LAWA, and applies
an implied conflict preemption analysis to the statute's required use of E-
Verify. Upon concluding that the Arizona law is preempted under an
implied conflict preemption analysis, Part V discusses the possible state
considerations in support of unilateral state immigration laws. The Note
23 Howard Fischer, End to Ariz. Employer-Sanction Law Sought: Business Group Takes
Up the Issue with the High Court, ARIZ. Bus. GAzEr-r, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.azcentral.
conbusiness/abg/articles/2009/08/06/20090806abg-sanctions.html (last visited Aug. 16,
2009) (discussing how LAWA's challengers claim that LAWA is preempted by federal law
and that other states are following LAWA's path, such that "[in the first three months of 2009
alone, over 1,000 immigration-related bills and resolutions were introduced in all 50 states ...
[a]t least 150 of these bills related specifically to employment, and 40 such bills have been
enacted in 28 states since 2007, the year Arizona approved its legislation ... disrupting the
congressional plan to comprehensively and uniformly regulate employment of immigrants")
(internal citations omitted).
24 See Complaint, Ariz. Contractors Ass'n v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (D. Ariz.
2008) (No. 07 Civ. 02496) [hereinafter Ariz. Contractors Ass'n Complaint].
25 Id. at 28-38.
26 See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A) (2008).
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concludes with a summary of the doctrine of preemption's resulting im-
plications with respect to LAWA's contested provisions.
I. STATE EMPLOYER SANCTIONS LAWS AND THE CASE OF ARIZONA
As noted, in protest of federal attempts to restrict the flow of immi-
gration, some states have adopted non-cooperation laws. 27 More restric-
tionist states have used the mounting fear of immigration and its fiscal
and national security implications as an opportunity to push forward
more stringent state immigration laws. 28 One such state law, the Legal
Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), is the focus of this Note.
Arizona has been dealing disproportionately with the problem of
illegal immigration-more people cross the border illegally into Arizona
than any other state.29 Expressing frustration with the lax implementa-
tion of federal immigration laws, then-Governor Janet Napolitano signed
a bill in 2007 regarded as the toughest state employer sanctions law in
the country in recent years. 30 The law took effect on January 1, 2008. 3 1
Despite reservations about the severe penalties under the law, Governor
Napolitano stated that she decided to move forward with it "because
Congress has failed miserably,"32 implying that Congress' inaction was
forcing states to act in its stead.
LAWA focuses on the employment of illegal immigrants. 33
Through its language, the Arizona state legislature intended "to ensure
that no businesses in Arizona knowingly or intentionally hire or employ
illegal immigrants. '34 The new law applies to all businesses in the state
of Arizona, regardless of size. 35 In the hope of furthering the federal
government's aim of preserving a legal work force, the law requires em-
27 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
28 See PBS, supra note 15 (discussing the mayor of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, Lou
Barletta's concern over the involvement of illegal aliens in local criminal activity as a trigger
for advocating for Hazleton's immigration ordinance).
29 Archibold, supra note 16, at A10.
30 Id.
31 See Ronald J. Hansen, Legal Arizona Workers Act 101: What Is the Law?, ARIz. RE-
PUBLIc, Dec. 30, 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special46/articles/l 128biz-sanc-
tionsl0lone.html (last visited May 22, 2009) [hereinafter Hansen, The Law].
32 Archibold, supra note 16, at AI0.
33 First passed in 2007, LAWA was amended in 2008 with the new provisions effective
as of May 1, 2008. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212; 23-212.01 (2008). The constitu-
tionality of the statute, as amended, is the topic of this Note.
34 Hansen, The Law, supra note 31; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(A) (2008)
("An employer shall not knowingly employ an unauthorized alien. If, in the case when an
employer uses a contract, subcontract or other independent contractor agreement to obtain the
labor of an alien in this state, the employer knowingly contracts with an u-authorized alien or
with a person who employs or contracts with an unauthorized alien to perform the labor, the
employer violates this subsection.").
35 Hansen, The Law, supra note 31.
STATE EMPLOYER SANCTIONS LAWS
ployers to verify the legal status of new employees.36 Under the law,
employers are also responsible for the verification of the legal status of
existing employees. 37 Employers are required to check the legal status of
their employees through the use of the federal E-Verify program. 38 E-
Verify is a "free online federal program that checks names and identifi-
cation documents [against a federal database] to ensure that new employ-
ees are eligible to work." 39
The responsibility for enforcing the sanctions prescribed by LAWA
falls primarily on the state's county attorneys. n0 The state attorney gen-
eral can investigate claims in cooperation with the county attorneys;
however, the role of prosecuting the claims is assumed entirely by the
county attorneys. 41 Unless determined to be frivolous, the county attor-
neys must investigate any alleged violation of the employer sanctions
law by inquiring about the legal status of employees through federal
authorities.42
36 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A) (2008) ("After December 31, 2007, every
employer, after hiring an employee, shall verify the employment eligibility of the employee
through the [E]-[V]erify program."); Hansen, The Law, supra note 31.
37 See Hansen, The Law, supra note 31.
38 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A) (2008); see Hansen, The Law, supra note 31.
39 See Hansen, The Law, supra note 31.
40 Ronald J. Hansen, Legal Arizona Workers Act 101: Who Enforces It?, ARIZ. REPUB-
LIC, Dec. 30, 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special46/articles/I 128biz-sanctions 101
three.html (last visited May 22, 2009) [hereinafter Hansen, Enforcement].
41 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212(B) (2008) (discussing the role of the state attorney
general and county attorneys in investigating and prosecuting claims); id. § 23-212(D) ("An
action for a violation of subsection A of this section shall be brought against the employer by
the county attorney in the county where the unauthorized alien employee is or was employed
by the employer."); Hansen, Enforcement, supra note 40.
42 See AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(C) (2008) (noting that "[i]f, after an investiga-
tion, the attorney general or county attorney determines that the complaint is not false and
frivolous," the attorney general or county attorney must notify the U.S. immigration and cus-
toms enforcement, local law enforcement, and the appropriate county attorney about the pres-
ence of the unauthorized alien); Hansen, Enforcement, supra note 40.
Although not addressed in this Note, it is important to mention that the requirement of
ascertaining an employee's legal status through federal authorities raises procedural concerns.
As local businesses argued against the state county attorneys in Arizona Contractors Associa-
tion, Inc. v. Candelaria (Arizona Contractors Association, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d
1036 (D. Ariz. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856
(9th Cir. 2009)), LAWA does not provide employers or employees with the minimum due
process guarantees provided by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (See
Ariz, Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 17-24.) At the very minimum, the Four-
teenth Amendment allows for any person to be provided with (1) notice of the charges at issue
(Id. at 18.); (2) notice of the time and place of a hearing (Id.); (3) the right to produce wit-
nesses at the hearing (Id.)-in this case, the right of employers "to call witnesses on their
behalf to establish the work authorization of [the individual subject to investigation]" (Id. at
21.); (4) the right to examine witnesses-in this case, the right to cross-examine the federal or
state government's witnesses on the issue of the validity of the investigated individual's work
authorization (Id. at 22.); and (5) the right to a full consideration and determination of the
issues based on the evidence (Id. at 18.). Furthermore, as indicated in the complaint, federal
immigration law, which addresses the due process rights of employers, indicates that when an
2009]
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Under the Arizona employer sanctions law, any member of the
community can make a complaint.43 However, the state has made efforts
to curb the potential abuse of LAWA, with authorities stressing that there
must be a reasonable and legal basis for filing a complaint. 4 In order to
prevent the misuse of the law, the state has classified a frivolous claim
made to authorities as a misdemeanor crime that carries the possible sen-
tence of up to thirty days in jail and a fine of $500, upon conviction.45
LAWA's distinction between knowingly and intentionally employ-
ing illegal immigrants becomes relevant in determining the applicable
punishment. 46 Under the statute, first-time offenders of the sanctions law
who "knowingly" employ illegal immigrants may have their business li-
censes suspended for up to ten days.47 In contrast, violators who "inten-
tionally" hire illegal immigrants must have their business licenses
suspended for at least ten days;48 but "[t]he law does not specify the
maximum suspension for a first offense for intentional violations. '49 In
both cases, "Superior Court judges will determine the length of the sus-
pension and base it on a variety of factors."'50 According to LAWA, the
factors include:
(i) The number of unauthorized aliens employed by the employer;
(ii) Any prior misconduct by the employer;
(iii) The degree of harm resulting from the violation;
(iv) Whether the employer made good faith efforts to comply with
any applicable requirements;
(v) The duration of the violation;
(vi) The role of the directors, officers or principals of the employer
in the violation; [and]
employer is found to have violated the law, an employer is provided with additional due pro-
cess rights, including the right to an evidentiary hearing, and the right to present evidence and
cross-examine witnesses presenting evidence against him or her (See id. at 19.).
43 Ronald J. Hansen, Legal Arizona Workers Act 101: What About Frivolous Com-
plaints?, Aiz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special46/articles/
1128biz-sanctions10lfour.html (last visited May 22, 2009).
44Id.
45 Id.
46 See ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 23-212(F); 23-212.01(F) (2008) (explaining the different re-
quirements and penalties for knowingly and intentionally hiring an undocumented alien, re-
spectively); Ronald J. Hansen, Legal Arizona Workers Act 101: What Are the Penalties?,
ARiz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special46/articles/1128biz-
sanctionsl01five.html (last visited May 22, 2009) [hereinafter Hansen, Penalties].
47 ARiz. REV. STAT. § 23-212(F)(l)(d) (2008) ("On finding a violation [by the em-
ployer, the court] [m]ay order the appropriate agencies to suspend all licenses ... held by the
employer for not to exceed ten business days."); see Hansen, Penalties, supra note 46.
48 See ARIz. REv. STAT. § 23-212.01(F)(1)(c) (2008).
49 Hansen, Penalties, supra note 46.
50 Id.
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(vii) Any other factors the court deems appropriate. 51
For both violations, employers must terminate all their illegal em-
ployees and "file an affidavit within three business days,' 52 swearing that
"the employer has terminated the employment of all unauthorized aliens
in this state and that the employer will not intentionally or knowingly
employ an unauthorized alien in this state [again]." 53 Both knowing and
intentional first-time violators are placed on probation, requiring them to
file quarterly reports with the county attorney on "each new employee
who is hired by the employer at the business location where the unautho-
rized alien performed work."54 However, the law further distinguishes
the two types of violators by the length of their probation: for those who
knowingly violate the sanctions law, probation lasts three years, while
those who intentionally violate the law face a probation period of five
years. 55 Repeat offenders of the law risk what has been called the "busi-
ness death penalty" 56-"permanent revocation of the state business li-
cense, effectively preventing a business from operating in the state."
57
The state of Arizona intends to treat the sanctions law as a law-
enforcement priority. 58 Under LAWA, prosecutors are required to re-
view every complaint, and "the superior courts are ordered to put the
sanction cases on a fast track."' 59 To facilitate the implementation and
efficiency of the sanctions law, the attorney general is required to "com-
pile a public database of employers who violate the sanctions law." 60
The law passed in Arizona echoes the approach taken by local gov-
ernment actors in many states in recent years. For example, in the state
of Virginia, Prince William County lawmakers unanimously approved
one of the toughest laws on illegal immigration. 61 The law provides for
51 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(F)(1)(d)(i-vii) (2008) (providing this list of factors
for Superior Court judges to determine the length of suspension of the business permits held
by employers who knowingly hire an illegal immigrant); id. § 23-212.01(F)(1)(c) (providing
the same list of factors for Superior Court judges to determine the length of suspension of the
business permits held by employers who intentionally hire an illegal immigrant); see also
Hansen, Penalties, supra note 46.
52 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(F)(1)(a), (F)(1)(c) (2008); id. §§ 23-
212.01(F)(l)(a), (F)(l)(d); see also Hansen, Penalties, supra note 46.
53 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(F)(1)(c) (2008) (knowingly); id. § 23-
212.01(F)(1)(d) (intentionally).
54 Id. § 23-212(F)(l)(b) (knowingly); id. § 23-212.01(F)(l)(b) (intentionally).
55 Hansen, Penalties, supra note 46.
56 Archibold, supra note 16.
57 Id.
58 Hansen, Enforcement, supra note 40.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See Nick Miroff, Pr. William Passes Resolution Targeting Illegal Immigration:
Stricter Aspects of Original Plan Are Softened, WASH. POST, July 11, 2007, at AOL.
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the denial of certain county services to illegal immigrants. 62 The ser-
vices include business licenses, drug counseling, housing assistance, and
services for the elderly.63 The law also allows police officers to check
the immigration status of anyone accused of breaking the law even if an
officer merely suspects that the person is an illegal immigrant.64
In the township of Riverside, New Jersey, a coalition of Riverside
business owners, landlords, and residents filed a suit in state court chal-
lenging a city ordinance adopted in 2006.65 The ordinance made it un-
lawful for any property owner to rent, lease, or obtain profit from the use
of personal property by illegal immigrants. 66 The ordinance also made it
unlawful to hire illegal immigrants.67 Violations of the ordinance would
result in either fines, terms of imprisonment, required community ser-
vice, or imposed business restrictions, including the denial of business
permits. 68 The petitioners argued that the city ordinance violated civil
rights under state law. 69 Furthermore, the petitioners contended that the
ordinance was too vague and overbroad, thereby unfairly putting local
businesses at risk while overstepping the city's authority. 70 Due to pub-
lic outcry and the effect of fleeing immigrants after the law initially
passed, the Riverside Township Committee repealed the ordinance in
September of 2007.71
Another example of a recent stringent sanctions law comes from the
town of Hazleton, Pennsylvania. The town of Hazleton witnessed an
influx of Hispanic immigrants following the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001.72 Many of the immigrants had allegedly been involved in a
62 See id.
63 See Kiran Krishnamurthy, Prince William Faces Suit; County Ready To Deny Ser-
vices, But Court Case May Delay Implementation, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 2007,
at Al.
64 See id.
65 See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Businesses Sue Riverside, NJ
Over Vague, Discriminatory Anti-Immigrant Ordinance, Oct. 18, 2006, http://www.aclu.org/
immigrants/discrim/27107prs20061018.html (last visited May 22, 2009).
66 See Riverside Township Illegal Immigration Relief Act, Riverside §§ 4, 5, N.J., Ordi-
nance 2006-16, amended by Riverside, N.J., Ordinance 2006-19, available at http://clearing-
house.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-000 I -0004.pdf.
67 See id.
68 See id.; Amendment to Ordinance 2006-16 § 166-6, Riverside, N.J., Ordinance 2006-
19, available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0001-0005.pdf; see also
Verified Complaint at 2, Riverside Coalition of Bus. Persons and Landlords v. Township of
Riverside (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2006), available at http:llwww.aclu-nj.org/downloadsl
RiversideComplaint.pdf.
69 See Press Release, supra note 65.
70 See id.
71 See Press Release, supra note 65; see Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union,
ACLU Applauds Repeal of Anti-Immigrant Ordinance in Riverside, NJ, Sept. 17, 2007,
www.aclu.org/immigrants/31856prs20070917.htm (last visited May 22, 2009).
72 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
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series of local crimes, stirring resentment against the growing immigrant
population within the town.73 In response, the city council passed the
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, which, among four provisions,
suspended the license of any business that employed, retained, aided, or
abetted illegal immigrants.74 Furthermore, the ordinance imposed a fine
in excess of $1,000 per day on landlords renting property to illegal immi-
grants.75 However, a federal district court overturned the Hazleton ordi-
nance in Lozano v. Hazleton on several grounds, including federal
preemption. 76
In Arizona, business groups and ethnically affiliated organizations,
who feared that LAWA would result in racial discrimination, challenged
the Arizona law. 77 The state of Arizona did acknowledge that Congress
delegated the power to regulate immigration to the federal government; 78
however, it argued that a plain reading of the federal statutory scheme
gives states the power to take away licenses and permits from companies
that knowingly hire illegal workers. 79 The language of the Arizona stat-
ute at issue is similar to provisions of the Hazelton ordinance struck
down in Lozano. As with the Arizona statute, provisions in the Hazleton
ordinance threatened to suspend and ultimately revoke licenses of busi-
nesses that hired illegal immigrants. 80 The court in Lozano held that the
ordinance put the city as well as state courts-instead of the federal gov-
ernment, since companies in violation would face trial in state courts-in
the position of determining who is legally entitled to work within state
boundaries. 8 ' Therefore, the ordinance was, in effect, regulating who
migrated to and from the state. In doing so, the state was encroaching
upon the federal government's exclusive right to regulate immigration.8 2
With the adverse response in the courts towards emerging stringent state
employer sanctions laws, and as LAWA's challengers attempt to appeal
73 See PBS, supra note 15.
74 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
75 See Press Release, America Civil Liberties Union, Hazleton Residents Sue to Halt
Harsh Anti-Immigrant Law, Aug. 15, 2006, http://www.aclupa.org/pressroom/hazletonre-
sidentssuetohalt.htm (last visited May 22, 2009).
76 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d. at 554-56.
77 See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 3-4.
78 See Letter from Janet Napolitano, Former Governor of Arizona, to Jim Weiers, For-
mer Speaker of the House of Representatives (July 2, 2007) (ARiz. REV. STAT. § 23-212
(2008) Historical and Statutory Notes (West 2009)).
79 See Arizona Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (D.
Ariz. 2008) (discussing how LAWA is an attempt to address the issue of the employment of
illegal immigrants through IRCA's licensing exception); Fischer, supra note 23 (discussing the
reliance of Arizona legislators on the licensing exception in enacting LAWA).
80 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 520, 523-24 ("[T]he '[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclu-
sively a federal power."') (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1976)).
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the Ninth Circuit court's holding to the Supreme Court, 83 the question is
whether the Arizona statute should have prevailed under a federal pre-
emption analysis.
II. THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The federal Preemption Doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution, which states that, "This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... 84
Accordingly, the Supremacy Clause invalidates any state law that "'in-
terfere[s] with or [is] contrary to federal law.' "85 This invalidation of
state law is termed "federal preemption. 86
Courts have recognized preemption in two forms: express preemp-
tion and implied preemption. 87 Preemption is express when "a statute
explicitly commands that state law be displaced. '8 8 There are two forms
of implied preemption: field preemption and conflict preemption. 89 Im-
plied field preemption occurs "where the scope of the federal law at issue
'indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the field exclu-
sively.' "90 It arises where (1) the federal regulatory scheme is so perva-
sive that it precludes the supplementation by states;9 1 (2) federal interest
in the field is so dominant that the subject matter of federal and local
laws is bound to either conflict or be duplicative;92 or (3) "'the object
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it reveal the same purpose.' "93
Implied conflict preemption arises where either (1) "the state law
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress;' , 94 or where (2) "it is 'impossible
for a ... party to comply with both state and federal law."' 95 The Su-
preme Court has held that implied field and implied conflict preemption
83 Fischer, supra note 23.
84 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
85 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (quoting New Jersey Payphone Ass'n v. Town of
West New York, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002)).
86 Id.
87 See id.
88 Id. (citing Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 245 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 2001)).
89 See id. at 521.
90 Id. (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)) (discussing im-
plied preemption generally).
91 See id. (citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988)).
92 See id.
93 Id. (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988)).
94 Id. at 525 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000)).
95 Id. (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 899).
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are not mutually exclusive, for "'a state law that falls within a pre-
empted field conflicts with Congress' intent (either express or plainly
implied) to exclude state regulation.' 96
However, federal preemption must comply with the Tenth Amend-
ment's anti-commandeering principle. The Tenth Amendment states
that, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people. '97 The Supreme Court has interpreted the anti-com-
mandeering principle to mean that Congress cannot require a state legis-
lature to "enact a particular kind of law,"98 or compel states to "'enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program.' ,99 Courts have never interpreted
the Constitution "'to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress' instructions."'1 00
In Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected the balancing
of federal and state interests when the object of a federal law was to
direct the functioning of the state executive. 10' In Printz, the Supreme
Court held that a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, which required officers to conduct a background search, was uncon-
stitutional on Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering grounds. 0 2 The
Court stated that "no comparative assessment of the various interests can
overcome [the] fundamental defect" of violating the principle of dual
sovereignty. 10 3 The Court saw the preservation of the balance between
federal and state governments as a necessary extension of individual lib-
erty.'1 4 Thus, the Court drew a bright-line rule, invoking the principle
that "laws that commandeered states into enacting or enforcing federal
laws are always unconstitutional."' 10 5
However, federal law remains constitutional in the context of the
anti-commandeering doctrine if Congress merely requires local govern-
ments to "take some legislative or executive action to comply with" fed-
eral regulations. 10 6 The Court in Reno v. Condon noted that such
commandeering is "'an inevitable consequence of regulating a state ac-
96 Id. at n.49 (quoting English v. Gen'l Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990)).
97 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
98 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000) (discussing the holdings in Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
99 Id. (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 935).
100 Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 162).
1o1 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.
102 See id. at 933-34.
103 Id. at 932.
104 See Pham, supra note 1, at 1406 (discussing the holding in Printz).
105 Id.
106 Id.
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tivity," ,10 7 for every "'federal regulation demands compliance.'",,0 8 The
Court noted that a "'[s]tate wishing to engage in certain activity must
take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with fed-
eral standards regulating that activity .. ' ."109 In Reno, the Court found
that the federal law at issue did not require an affirmative duty on behalf
of the state."Il 0 It did not require the state legislature to enact any laws or
regulations, nor did it "require state officials to assist in the enforcement
of federal statutes regulating private individuals." 11'
In the context of immigration laws, states are preempted from estab-
lishing laws or policies for the sole purpose of regulating immigration." 12
The power to regulate immigration is considered an exclusively federal
power. 1 3 Courts and scholars have understood the immigration power
as stemming from two sources: "specific constitutional provisions and
the nation's status as a sovereign entity." 114 The constitutional provi-
sions identified as legitimate sources of the immigration power include
the Naturalization Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Foreign Affairs
Power. 1 5 Through the Naturalization Clause, the Constitution grants
Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. 16 The
Commerce Clause grants Congress the right to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and between the states.' 17 Through the imposition of
taxes or other regulations on carriers, Congress has used the Commerce
Clause to regulate immigration. 18
The Foreign Affairs Power is the one source not explicitly referred
to in the Constitution. Possibly the more contentious source, it draws
107 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000) (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)).
108 Id. (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
109 Id. at 150-51 (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
110 See id. at 151
111 Id.
112 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006) (illustrating the pervasive nature of federal regulation of
illegal immigrants).
113 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (stating that the "[p]ower to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power").
114 Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting
Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
965, 988 (2004).
115 See id.
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
117 Id. at cl. 3.
118 See Thomas A. Aleinkoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 200-
01 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court in Edye v. Robertson relied on "Con-
gress' Commerce Clause powers to uphold a federal statute . . . that imposed a tax of fifty
cents on every noncitizen arriving in the United States .... "); id. ("Congress [has] the power
to pass a law regulating immigration as a part of commerce of this country with foreign na-
tions."') (citing Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884)); see also id. (discussing how
the Supreme Court in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), concluded that migration is
commerce).
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upon references from which one could infer the intent to embrace rela-
tions with other countries as one nation." 19 For example, through the
"Congressional powers to declare war, . . . the Senate power to advise
and consent to the appointment of ambassadors, . . and the Presidential
power to make treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate,"' 20
courts have held,1 21 and history shows, 122 that immigration law reflects
foreign policy. Conversely, immigration law has been used as an "in-
strument[ ] to achieve the nation's foreign policy objectives." 123 For ex-
ample, the Refugee Act of 1980 "is structured to reflect [American]
foreign policy priorities."' 24 Under the Act, "[tihe President, in consulta-
tion with Congress, decides how many refugees will be admitted each
year and ... how the admissions ... are allocated." 125 Reflecting for-
eign policy at the time of its enactment, "Presidents allocated almost all
of the refugee admissions to people fleeing communist countries like Vi-
etnam or other United States adversaries [such as] Iran."' 2 6
Critics of the Foreign Affairs Power justification argue that states
are playing an increasingly significant role on the global stage. For ex-
ample, Peter Spiro argues that "[s]tate officials now have routine deal-
ings with foreign governments" pertaining to "cultural and economic
matters."' 27 In addition, Spiro states that almost all states have "estab-
lished trade and tourism offices in various locations abroad."'' 28 This
conceivably has resulted in states "taking on some of the attributes of
nationhood."' 29 Therefore, he further contends that foreign countries are
more inclined to hold states responsible for their potential immigration
policies, thus freeing the federal government from the foreign relations
implications.130 However, state interactions with foreign governments
appear to be too limited to warrant unilateral immigration laws. Further-
more, this criticism of the Foreign Affairs Power fails to address the
119 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
606 (1889) (discussing the federal government's exclusive role in determining relations with
foreign states, both in war and peace).
120 Pham, supra note 114, at 988 n. 117 (internal citations omitted).
121 See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 581.
122 See Pham, supra note 114, at 992 (discussing how political relations between the
United States and Mexico reflect immigration policies concerning undocumented Mexican
immigrants).
123 Id.
124 See id. at 993.
125 d; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2006) (Refugee Act) (stating that decisions shall be
made with consideration for humanitarian concerns of special interest to the United States and
national interests).
126 See Pham, supra note 114, at 992.
127 Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J.
INT'L L. 121, 161 (1994).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 163.
130 See id. at 162-63.
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permeability of state borders as lenient state borders do not restrict illegal
immigrants to one state once within U.S. borders. Therefore, one state's
immigration policies may not represent all of the affected states.
Despite criticisms of the Foreign Affairs Power justification, the
United States' status as a sovereign nation supports the proposition that
the immigration power is an exclusively federal power.131 As a sover-
eign nation, "the United States must necessarily have the exclusive
power to control entry and exit from its borders; otherwise, it would be
subject to the control of other nations."' 132 The Supreme Court first ar-
ticulated this notion in the Chinese Exclusion Case, which upheld an
1888 federal law that prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the
United States after the government had initially granted them the right to
return. 133 In its rationale, the Court characterized the government's abil-
ity to exclude foreigners as part of the sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution. 134 In its analysis, "[t]he Court compared the immigration
power to the power to declare war and make treaties, and reasoned that
because they all affect foreign policy, the powers belong exclusively to
the federal government and are 'incapable of transfer to any other par-
ties."1 35 The Court has reiterated this rationale in subsequent immigra-
tion cases. 136
These sources have been the rationale for striking down state laws
concerning immigrants. For example, consider the Supreme Court's
holdings in Graham v. Richardson137 and Mathews v. Diaz.138 In Gra-
ham v. Richardson, the Supreme Court held that state laws denying wel-
fare benefits to resident aliens or to aliens who had not resided in the
United States for a certain number of years violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 139 Furthermore, by creating circumstances that would affect the
flow of immigrants into the applicable state, the Supreme Court held that
the state was encroaching upon the federal government's exclusive im-
migration power.140 In contrast, in Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court
upheld a similar federal law that limited Medicare eligibility to perma-
nent resident aliens who had continuously resided within the United
131 See Pham, supra note 114, at 990.
132 Id.; see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("Our cases have long recognized the
power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Govern-
ment's political departments. ....").
133 See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 581 (1889).
134 See id. at 609.
135 Pham, supra note 114, at 990 (quoting Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609).
136 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1976).
137 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
138 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
139 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
140 See id. at 379-80 (citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)).
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States for five years or more. 141 As one commentator noted, "[t]he [Ma-
thews] Court linked the federal government's immigration power to its
foreign policy powers and expressed reluctance to subject the federal
government to similar constitutional restrictions in this realm."1 42 The
Court distinguished the two cases on the grounds of the foreign policy
argument; the Court highlighted that "states have no similar foreign pol-
icy interests justifying discrimination based on alienage."1 43
Although states may not have similar foreign policy interests, some
critics argue that immigration is largely a concern at the state level. 144
For example, Spiro argues that the distribution of illegal immigrants in
the United States is uneven. 145 He establishes that this was evident as
early as 1980, when the proportion of illegal immigrants located in Cali-
fornia was estimated at above forty percent, 146 more than three times the
distribution allocated on a national per capita basis. 147 Furthermore,
Spiro stated that at that time, Arizona, Florida, and Texas accounted for
disproportionately high numbers, and "together with New York, ...
these states [were] ... home to four out of every five illegal aliens in the
United States."' 148 Spiro further contends that states that are heavily
populated with undocumented aliens also incur disproportionate costs.149
As a result, the costs of public services that support many illegal immi-
grants are not equally spread across states. 150 He supports this theory by
summarizing a 1994 study commissioned by the Department of Justice,
stating the findings as follows:
[U]ndocumented aliens in California cost the state $368
million in annual incarceration expenses, $1.289 billion
for public education, and a minimum of $113 million in
emergency medical services, for a total cost . . . of al-
most $1.8 billion. At the same time, the state collected
an estimated $732 million in sales, income, and property
taxes from the undocumented alien population. This an-
nual shortfall of more than $1 billion for undocumented
alien-related expenses is a significant one against total
state expenditures of $63 billion, of which only a frac-
tion remains for discretionary programs.' 5'
141 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82-84.
142 Pham, supra note 114, at 994.
143 Id.
144 See Spiro, supra note 127, at 121.
145 See id. at 125.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 126.
15o See id. at 126-27.
151 Id. at 126-27 (citing REBECCA L. CLARK ET AL., URBAN INsTTruTE, FISCAL IMPACTS
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Although the disproportionate effects of illegal immigration may
warrant a claim for individual state immigration laws, the constitutional
sources of the immigration power as well as the Supreme Court's inter-
pretations of this area of law indicate that the framers intended the immi-
gration power to be an exclusively federal power. 152 Furthermore, the
constitutional mandate requires uniformity among immigration laws.' 5 3
This can only succeed if such laws are drafted by one uniform govern-
mental body. The constitutional mandate requires both uniform laws as
well as uniform enforcement as "nonuniform enforcement has the same
negative effect[s] as nonuniform laws and implicates the same foreign
policy concerns." 54 Nonuniform enforcement, a likely result of inde-
pendent state immigration laws, would violate the constitutional man-
date. It could result in a variety of enforcement approaches and
techniques by state authorities, resulting in different immigration laws,
raising the concern of what has been termed the problem of "a thousand
borders."' 55 These considerations justify the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion in the field of immigration.
III. Is THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL
LAW ON THE GROUNDS OF EXPRESS PREEMPTION?
The enactment of LAWA is not preempted on the grounds of ex-
press preemption. LAWA can be reconciled with the express preemption
of state laws on the matter under Congress' controlling immigration leg-
islation, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).156 At
the core of this issue is the means by which LAWA regulates the employ-
ment of unauthorized aliens. This can be addressed through an analysis
of the licensing exception in IRCA's section on preemption, which sug-
gests that the means of regulation articulated under LAWA are not ex-
pressly preempted under the licensing exception.
In enacting IRCA, "Congress expressly pre-empted state and local
[sanction] laws."' 57 The Act states that federal law "pre-empts any state
or local law imposing similar criminal sanctions (other than through li-
censing and similar laws) upon those who employ unauthorized
aliens."' 158 Under the Act, "[t]he licensing exception was designed and
OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: SELECTED ESTIMATES FOR SEVEN STATES 8, 11, 13-14 (1994)
(footnotes omitted)).
152 See Pham, supra note 114, at 987.
153 See id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 995.
156 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C .)
157 Ariz Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 28.
158 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2000).
STATE EMPLOYER SANCTIONS LAWS
intended to allow state governments to take action against the business
license for employers 'found to have violated the sanctions provision' [of
the statute].' 15 9 The licensing exception addresses methods of punishing
employers that illegally employ unauthorized immigrants rather than
granting states the right "to pass laws prohibiting the employment of un-
authorized aliens."' 160
In light of legislative language and legislative intent, LAWA does
not present a problem under the doctrine of express preemption. As pre-
viously stated, preemption is express when "a statute explicitly com-
mands that state law be displaced."' 161 As the court held in Lozano, the
licensing clause, occasionally referred to as the savings clause, 162 refers
to a state's right to revoke local licenses "for a violation of the federal
IRCA sanction provisions, as opposed to revoking a business license for
violation of local laws."' 63 In supporting this notion, the court cited leg-
islative history which suggests that the penalties imposed under IRCA
are designed to preempt "'state or local laws providing civil fines and/or
criminal sanctions on hiring, recruitment or referral of undocumented
aliens.'"'64 However, legislative history indicates that the penalties im-
posed are not intended to preempt or prevent "'lawful state or local
processes concerning the suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a
license to any person who has been found to have violated the sanctions
provisions [under IRCA].' "165 In summary, IRCA's preemption clause,
in conjunction with its licensing exception, does not expressly preempt
"state or local laws dealing with 'suspension, revocation or refusal to
reissue a license' to an entity found to have violated the sanction provi-
sions of IRCA."' 66
In distinguishing the Hazleton ordinance in Lozano from LAWA, it
is apparent that Hazleton's ordinance suspended the business permits of
those who violated its local law as opposed to those who violated
IRCA. 167 Thus, in the case of Hazleton, the licensing exception does not
apply. In contrast, LAWA provides that in investigating a complaint
159 Ariz. Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 28 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
(2000)).
160 See id. at 29.
161 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Green
v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 245 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 2001)).
162 See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2009).
163 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
164 Id. at 520 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-682(l) (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5662).
165 Id. (quoting H.R. REr. No. 99-682(t) (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5662).
166 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I) (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5662).
167 See id.
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against a person alleged to have violated the law itself, "the attorney
general or county attorney shall verify the work authorization of the al-
leged unauthorized alien with the federal government pursuant to 8
[U.S.C.] § 1373(c). A state, county or local official shall not attempt to
independently make a final determination on whether an alien is author-
ized to work in the United States."168 This requirement within LAWA
imposes sanctions upon a determination by the federal government that
the employment of an individual has in fact violated federal immigration
law as opposed to imposing sanctions pursuant to a violation of local
law. By requiring cooperation with the federal government pursuant to
legislation, LAWA is acting within the context of federal immigration
law. It is acting within the framework of federal determinations of what
in fact constitutes an illegal alien under federal law, as opposed to arriv-
ing at its own determination on the legal status of aliens. The latter ap-
proach would result in the control of immigration, thereby encroaching
upon federal domain. Such cooperative consideration can be inferred
from legislative history as it indicates that § 1373(c) and IRCA were
enacted concurrently with the hope that they be interpreted in conjunc-
tion with one another. 169
IV. Is THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL
LAW ON THE GROUNDS OF IMPLIED PREEMPTION?
A. Does the Legal Arizona Workers Act Prevail Under an Implied
Field Preemption Analysis?
The enactment of LAWA is not preempted on the grounds of im-
plied field preemption. As previously stated, implied field preemption
occurs "where the scope of the federal law at issue 'indicates that Con-
gress intended federal law to occupy the field exclusively."' ' 170 As
noted, it arises in three situations: (1) where the federal regulatory
scheme is so pervasive that it precludes the supplementation by states; 171
(2) where the federal interest in the field is so dominant that the subject
matter of federal and local laws is bound to either conflict or be duplica-
tive; 172 or (3) where "'the object sought to be obtained by the federal law
and the character of obligations imposed by it reveal the same
purpose.' "173
168 ARIz. REV. STAT. § 23-212(B); §23-212.01(B) (2008).
169 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373(c) Historical and Statutory Notes (West 2009) (noting that
Section 1373 was enacted as part of IRCA).
170 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
171 See id. (citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988)).
172 See id.
173 id. (quoting Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300).
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In accordance with its exclusive power, the federal government has
adopted "a comprehensive system of laws" pertaining to the regulation of
immigration, which includes regulations and the use of administrative
agencies.1 74 Through this system, the federal government regulates
"whether and under what conditions individuals may enter, stay in, and
work in the U.S. and [provides for] a system of civil and criminal penal-
ties for those violating the law, including employers who knowingly em-
ploy unauthorized aliens." 175 Furthermore, federal legislation determines
"who is eligible to work in the United States" as well as "the process by
which employers must verify the eligibility of job applicants. ' 176 The
federal government has consistently occupied this field of immigration
legislation through various laws which include, but are not limited to, the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 177 IRCA, and the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 178 It is
clear from the breadth of immigration legislation-and more specifically,
legislation that regulates the employment of illegal immigrants-that
federal legislation dominates this field so as to render any similar state
law, especially one that reveals the same purpose, duplicative. It is also
evident from its dominance in the field that federal law is intentionally
pervasive.
However, at the heart of the discussion on whether LAWA is pre-
empted on the grounds of implied field preemption is whether the subject
matter of the state law is traditionally an area of state or federal responsi-
bility. In Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently upheld LAWA, holding
that it was within the state's police powers and thus not preempted by
federal law. 179 The court noted that "[w]hen Congress legislates 'in a
field which the States have traditionally occupied ... we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."' 180 In arriving at its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
court cited the Supreme Court's holding in De Canas v. Bica, which
upheld a "state law prohibiting the employment of unauthorized aliens
against a preemption challenge because it concluded that the authority to
regulate the employment of unauthorized workers is 'within the main-
174 See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 28.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 29.
177 Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1537 (2006)).
178 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 and 18 U.S.C.)
179 See 558 F.3d 856, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2009).
180 Id. at 864 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)).
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stream' of the state's police powers."181 According to De Canas, the fact
that aliens are the subject of state regulation does not automatically
render it an immigration regulation that requires the determination of,
and control over, those who are admitted and remain within the coun-
try.182 Relying on De Canas, the court concluded that "the power to
regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens remains within the
states' historic police powers" and that therefore "an assumption of non-
preemption applied in this case."' 183 Accordingly, the court concluded
that LAWA, which in effect regulates the employment of unauthorized
aliens within Arizona, is not federally preempted on the grounds of im-
plied field preemption.1 84
In considering De Canas, it is important to note that the Supreme
Court's focus in determining the state's right to regulate employment
concerned the California statute's purpose, which was aimed at protect-
ing California's fiscal interests and limiting the impact the employment
of unauthorized aliens had on these interests. 8 5 The Court found that the
statute focused on essential local problems and was therefore "tailored to
combat effectively the perceived evils." 186 In contrast, the statutory lan-
guage in the case of LAWA does not indicate a purpose of protecting
fiscal interests, and neither did the Ninth Circuit court address a "tailor-
ing" of the statute to combat threats to these interests.187 These consider-
ations raise questions regarding the conclusive applicability of the
Supreme Court's analysis in De Canas to LAWA, an issue that was not
addressed by the Ninth Circuit court.
B. Is the Required Use of E-Verify Under the Legal Arizona Workers
Act Preempted by Federal Law on the Grounds of Implied
Conflict Preemption?
1. Background Information on the Establishment and Use of E-
Verify
The employment eligibility verification program (E-Verify) is a
product of the federal government's desire to curb the employment of
181 Id. (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)); see also De Canas, 424
U.S. at 356 (discussing each state's "broad authority under their police powers to regulate...
employment relationship[s] to protect workers within the [s]tate").
182 See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355 ("[T]he Court has never held that every state enact-
ment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-
empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised.").
183 Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir. 2009).
184 See id.
185 See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-57.
186 Id. at 357.
187 See generally ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2008); id.§ 23-212.01; Chicanos Por
La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009).
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illegal immigrants. The employment of unauthorized aliens by U.S. em-
ployers remains a substantial problem as the desire to obtain employment
within the U.S. remains one of the primary causes of illegal immigra-
tion.' 88 The employment of illegal aliens occurs despite efforts on the
part of federal immigration legislation, such as 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, which
prohibits the employment of unauthorized aliens.189 Under this legisla-
tion, the federal government attempts to prevent the employment of ille-
gal aliens by making it illegal "to recruit or refer for a fee, for
employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unau-
thorized alien."' 90 The statute reinforces this attempt through the imple-
mentation of civil and criminal penalties on employers that choose to
employ unauthorized aliens. 91 The statute also requires employers to
verify the identity and work eligibility of all employees on an 1-9
form.' 92 Violations of employer requirements can result in fines for
first-time offenders and can amount to criminal sanctions for repeat
offenders. 193
In an effort to more effectively enforce the statute's employment
restrictions and eliminate the use of fraudulent documents on the part of
illegal aliens, Congress authorized the creation of three pilot pro-
grams. 194 These pilot programs were intended to allow "an employer to
confirm a new hire's employment eligibility with more accuracy."' 195 In-
itially, employment verifications were conducted through a "toll-free
telephone line or other toll-free electronic media."' 96 The first of these
programs, and the only one still in operation and at issue in the case
challenging LAWA, was referred to as the "Basic Pilot Program."' 97 The
Basic Pilot Program is currently referred to as E-Verify. 19 8
E-Verify outlines procedures whereby employers participating in
the program submit certain information pertaining to their new employ-
ees to the federal government for confirmation of their identity and em-
ployment eligibility. 99 The employers "receive a response from the
verification system as to whether the [new employee] is authorized to
work in the United States and whether he or she has presented a valid
188 See Complaint at 2, United States v. State of Illinois, No. 07 Civ. 3261 (C.D. I11. Sept.
24, 2007) [hereinafter Illinois Complaint].
189 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).
190 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(I)(A) (2006).
191 Id. §§ 1324a(f)(1), 1324a(g)(2).
192 See Illinois Complaint, supra note 188, at 3.
193 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(f)(1); 1324a(g)(2) (2006).
194 See Illinois Complaint, supra note 188, at 3.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See id. at 3-4.
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Social Security Number. °200 A valid Social Security Number matches
the individual's name and date of birth as indicated in the Social Security
Administration's records.20'
Congress provided that employers may elect to participate in the
Basic Pilot Program, except for specified government entities and certain
entities subject to statutory orders whose participation in the program is
mandatory. 20 2 Initially, Congress intended to terminate the program four
years after its implementation. 20 3 However, as part of a "desire to further
evaluate the efficacy of the Basic Pilot Program," Congress amended and
extended its initial authorization to "eleven years following [the] initial
implementation of the program."'2°4 Furthermore, Congress extended the
program to all fifty states on December 1, 2004, as it sought to encourage
a wider use of the program.20 5 In addition to announcing the expansion
of the program to all fifty states, on December 20, 2004, the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services announced the introduction
of an internet-based verification system.206 The voluntary participatory
nature of the program was not affected by the extension of the
program.207
The current employment eligibility verification system is intended
to prove the identity and eligibility to work of each employee and oper-
ates as follows: "Once an applicant accepts a job offer, he or she presents
certain documents to the participating employer and completes [his or
her] part of the Form I-9. '"208 The required documents are divided into
three lists (A, B, and C) on the employment verification form. 209 Either
one document from list A or one document each from both lists B and C
is required.2 10 List A provides documents that evidence both identity
and eligibility to work.2 1' Such documents include, but are not limited
to, (1) an expired or unexpired U.S. passport, (2) a Permanent Resident
Card or Alien Registration Receipt Card, (3) an unexpired foreign pass-
port with an endorsement that shows eligibility for employment, and (4)
an unexpired Employment Authorization Document that contains a pho-
200 Id. at 4.
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 Id. at 5.
205 See id.
206 See d.
207 See id.
208 Id. at 5-6.
209 See Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, The Complexity of Verifying Work Au-
thorization, 2 BENDER'S ImMIG. BULL. 944 (1997).
210 See id.
211 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, OMB.
No. 1615-0047, Form 1-9: Employment Eligibility Verification (2007).
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tograph.212 List B specifies acceptable documents establishing identity,
which include, but are not limited to, (1) a driver's license, (2) a federal
ID card provided it contains a photograph or physical characteristics, (3)
a school ID card provided it contains a photograph, and (4) alternative
documents for individuals under the age of eighteen.21 3 List C specifies
acceptable documents establishing work eligibility, which include, but
are not limited to, (1) a Social Security card, (2) an original U.S. birth
certificate, and (3) a U.S. citizen ID card.214
Within three days of hiring the employee, the employer must ex-
amine the documents provided by the new employee to determine
whether they appear to be genuine on their face, and if they do appear
genuine, the employer may then proceed to complete the employer's por-
tion of the Form I-9.215 In completing the Form 1-9, the employer attests
to the examination of the employee documents provided. 216 The em-
ployer must submit these documents and any other required information
to the verification system within three days of hiring the employee. 217
The system then compares the information submitted by the employer
with the Social Security Administration's records and, if necessary, also
with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) records.218
Although the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for
three days, 92 percent of the time the employer is notified within seconds
whether the new hire is authorized to work.219 If the system cannot con-
firm an employee's work eligibility, the verification system issues a "ten-
tative nonconfirmation" notice. 220 These notices are often referred to as
"no-match" letters. 221 If the tentative nonconfirmation notice is not con-
tested by the new hire, it is considered a final nonconfirmation. 222 In the
event the new hire does contest the tentative nonconfirmation notice, the
employee is provided with instructions on how to pursue a secondary
verification, which must be pursued within eight working days. 22 3 Con-
gress prohibits employers from taking "an adverse employment action
against a new hire based upon a pending [tentative nonconfirmation no-
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 See Illinois Complaint, supra note 188, at 6.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See id.
220 Id.
221 See, e.g., Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos,
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VA.ND. L. REv. 55, 116,
n.253 (2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 422.120(a) (2008)).
222 See Illinois Complaint, supra note 188, at 6.
223 See id.
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tice], unless and until it is resolved with a final confirmation.1224 After
the secondary verification process is completed, the verification system
issues a "final confirmation or final nonconfirmation of employment eli-
gibility." 225 If the secondary confirmation results in a final nonconfirma-
tion determination, an employer faces two options: (1) it can dismiss the
new employee or (2) it can continue to employ the new hire.226 If the
employer chooses to continue to employ the new hire, it must notify
DHS.227 DHS may subsequently bring an enforcement action against the
employer. 228
2. An Implied Conflict Preemption Analysis of the Legal
Arizona Workers Act's Required Use of E-Verify
The primary preemption concern with the required use of the E-
Verify program under LAWA is that it presents a case of implied conflict
preemption. The required use of E-Verify under LAWA should have
been preempted on the grounds of implied conflict preemption. As pre-
viously stated, implied conflict preemption arises where a state law
"'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution"' of a fed-
eral law's objectives, or where a state law renders it "'impossible for
a ... party to comply with both state and federal law."' 229 The latter
example of implied conflict preemption is easier to identify. However,
in identifying when a state law frustrates a federal law's objectives and
purpose, the courts have looked to the congressional intent in enacting
the federal law;2 30 congressional intent may either be explicit or implicit
in the statute's structure and purpose.23 ' In determining the congres-
sional intent and objectives, courts look to the statutory language and
history of the statute. 232 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that
"all that is necessary to demonstrate congressional intent to preempt state
law is the presence of an actual conflict between state and federal
1aw."2 3 3
224 Id. (citing IIRIRA, supra note 178, § 403(a)(4)(B)(iii)).
225 Id.
226 See id. at 6-7.
227 See id. at 7.
228 See id.
229 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting Geier
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000)).
230 See, e.g., id. at 519-21.
231 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996); see also NORMAN J. SINGER
& J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 48:1-48:4 (7th ed.
2009).
232 See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 231, at §§ 48:1-48:4.
233 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the United States' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 7, United States of America v. State of Illinois (C.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2007)
(No. 07 Civ. 3261) (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Geier, 529 U.S. at 884-85).
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The first example of implied conflict preemption, as previously de-
fined, which relates to the objectives of a congressional statute, is appli-
cable in this case. In its holding on the appeal raised by challengers of
LAWA, the Ninth Circuit found that Arizona's mandatory use of E-Ver-
ify was not preempted on the grounds of implied conflict preemption by
the voluntary nature of the use of E-Verify, as legislated at the national
level.234 The court stated that if Congress had intended to forbid states
from requiring E-Verify's use, it would have done so as it has done with
other legislation. 235 However, from the history of the statute that re-
sulted in the implementation of the E-Verify program, it is clear that
Congress intended for the program to be voluntary. LAWA conflicts
with federal law and information provided to employers by the federal
government regarding the voluntary nature of their participation in E-
Verify. 236 Although the federal government's repeated extensions and
expansion of the use of E-Verify may lend support to the Ninth Circuit's
holding on the issue, it is notable that throughout these extensions and
expansions, the use of E-Verify has remained voluntary under federal
legislation. If it so intended, the federal government could have required
the use of E-Verify under federal legislation as it is not state-adminis-
tered, therefore requiring its use would not constitute state comman-
deering. 237 In conclusion, the required use of the E-Verify program
under LAWA runs contrary to the congressional intent, and makes it im-
possible for an individual to comply with both the voluntary nature of the
E-Verify program and the sanctions law of Arizona. Therefore, the re-
quired use of E-Verify under LAWA should have been preempted on the
grounds of implied conflict preemption.
3. Further Considerations Regarding the Required Use of E-
Verify Under the Legal Arizona Workers Act
The required use of E-Verify raises several additional concerns. For
example, it presents problems for companies that are located in multiple
states, requiring them, against their "voluntary" right, to comply with E-
Verify if they want to conduct business affairs in the state of Arizona.238
Furthermore, the law presents some logistical problems in terms of
implementing the use of E-Verify in local businesses. One complaint
concerns the inaccuracies associated with the E-Verify program. A con-
234 See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2009).
235 See id. at 867.
236 See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 23.
237 See HRIRA, supra note 178, § 402(a); see generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services: E-Verify, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c
6a7543f6d I a/?vgnextoid=75bce2e26140511 OVgnVCM 100000471819OaRCRD&vgnext
channel=75bce2e2614051 10VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
238 See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 23-24.
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gressional audit from 2006 indicated that "4 percent of the time E-Ver-
ify ... initially labeled workers ineligible for employment when in fact
they had work authorization. That means that [1] in 25 times a name is
wrongly rejected by the program." 239 One reported survey stated that the
rate for errors was higher among naturalized citizens. 240 "Nearly 10 per-
cent of naturalized citizens are deemed ineligible to work at first, when
in fact they are eligible . *... ,,24 Errors can be attributed to common
factors, for example, "a person's name change can dramatically skew
results of the online verification. '242 As a result, authorized workers
may be characterized as illegal. Furthermore, the number of reported
inaccuracies among social security records increases with delays in up-
dating the records and the occasional accidental distribution of duplicate
numbers. 243
On a local level, as some of the plaintiffs have confirmed, there are
some small businesses that do not own computers and do not have in-
ternet access which would enable them to use E-Verify at their respective
business locations. 244 Providing computers and the relevant software re-
quired to use E-Verify, and thus comply with the Arizona sanctions law,
could result in additional expenses for many businesses.245 Small busi-
nesses would also incur expenses in training employees to use E-Verify
and in providing them with the necessary training equipment. 246
Another concern arising from the use of E-Verify, in order to com-
ply with the Arizona law, is E-Verify's expiration date. 24 7 Originally set
to expire on November 30, 2008,248 Congress extended the program to
September 30, 2009.249 Although there are bills pending in Congress on
the issue, there are no immediate plans on behalf of the federal govern-
239 Daniel Gonzdlez, Sanctions Law Begins: Many Ariz. Businesses Are Still Unprepared,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special46/articles/1230
sanctionsstart.html (last visited May 22, 2009).
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Tara Malone, Justice Department Sues State on Immigrant Workers Protection, DAILY
HERALD, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.dailyherald.com/story/print/?id=44735 (last visited May
22, 2009).
243 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, RACING TOWARD "BIG BROTHER": COMPUTER VERIFI-
CATION, NATIONAL ID CARDS, AND IMMIGRANT CONTROL ii-iii (National Council of LA Raza
1995).
244 See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 13.
245 See id. at 13-14.
246 See id.
247 See id. at 33.
248 See id.
249 See Pub. L. No. 110-329, § 143,122 Stat. 3580 (2008), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-
8, § 101, Stat. 988 (2009) (amending the expiration date of the Basic Pilot Program as initially
laid out in the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996).
STATE EMPLOYER SANCTIONS LAWS
ment to extend the program beyond that date. 250 The Arizona sanctions
law does not provide for the use of other verification methods upon the
expiration of E-Verify, which raises questions about the longevity and
efficiency of the law itself.25'
There are also concerns that arise regarding the potential discrimi-
natory implications of applying the Arizona sanctions law. For example,
under LAWA, complaints may be initiated by any person
without any standards, without any requirements for the
identification of the person[ ] who is accused of not be-
ing authorized to work in this country, without any dis-
closure or identification of the basis for the allegation
that an employee is not authorized to work, and without
any requirement that any basis for the allegation must
exist before an investigation must be initiated.252
The fact that members of the public can initiate complaints raises
concerns about the use of discriminatory practices and malicious intent in
making such complaints. The Maricopa County Attorney and Sheriff
have specifically stated that they will mostly rely on complaints from the
public "about employers thought to be hiring illegal workers, including
those made anonymously. '253 Such complaints may be initiated solely
on the basis of race or language abilities, accents, and other racially
targeted and unlawful characteristic determinations. 254 Furthermore,
these discriminatory practices have the potential to evolve into the classi-
fication of certain groups as suspect members of the communities.
Therefore, the law may potentially be inconsistently or inappropriately
applied. The lax requirements under the law for filing complaints may
result in complaints "initiated for reasons unrelated to the enforcement of
immigration laws."'255 This is of special concern in a state such as Ari-
zona where anti-immigrant sentiment is already prevalent and high.
Furthermore, the aforementioned plausible consequences of this ap-
proach to receiving complaints potentially raises legal concerns when
complaints are presented to the federal government for investigative pur-
poses. The approach may run counter to federal immigration law, which
requires that the federal government investigate "only those complaints
'which, on their face have a substantial probability of validity."' 256
250 National Conference of State Legislature, Immigrant Policy Project: E-Verify Fre-
quently Asked Questions, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13127#When-expire (last visited Aug.
9, 2009).
251 See ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 23-212 - 23-214 (2008).
252 See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 20.
253 Gonzdlez, supra note 239.
254 See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n Complaint, supra note 24, at 20.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 19 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(c)(1)(B) (2006)).
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V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ENACTMENT OF UNILATERAL STATE
IMMIGRATION LAWS
There are multiple factors that drive states to enact individual immi-
gration regulatory statutes. Among the states that prefer less stringent
laws relative to federal immigration laws, non-cooperative states enact
their laws in an attempt to circumvent the potential burden imposed upon
state governments while implementing federal immigration laws. As
may be the case with other federal laws, the enforcement of immigration
laws may divert even more of a state's limited resources from a state's
typical law enforcement functions. 257
Another consideration among non-cooperative states is the impact
that the enforcement of federal immigration laws may have on beneficial
relationships with immigrant communities, which in turn affects the local
community. States worry that the enforcement of federal laws may de-
stroy existing relationships with immigrant communities. 258 These rela-
tionships often assist law enforcement officers in enforcing the law and
solving local crimes, thus, the destruction of these relationships would
interfere with the state's police power to protect public safety. 259
Non-cooperative states are also concerned about the impact federal
immigration laws may have on public safety and public health. Many
states are concerned that without non-cooperation laws, some illegal im-
migrants may shun essential government services, such as emergency
healthcare, for fear of detection and possible deportation. 260 This raises
public safety and health concerns. For example, a health risk may result
where a health concern is contagious and the affected illegal immigrant
refuses to seek medical attention for fear of detection. 26'
Furthermore, non-cooperative states are concerned about the devel-
opment of an underprivileged subclass of illegal immigrants. As illegal
immigrants shun public schools and government agencies for fear of de-
tection and possible deportation, the likelihood of an underprivileged
subclass developing is significant. 262 This could also result in a rise in
criminal activity and an increased dependence on public benefits.2 63 The
Supreme Court addressed the development of an underprivileged sub-
class in Plyler v. Doe.264 Although the rationale in Plyler dealt specifi-
cally with illegal immigrant children, it can conceivably be extended to
257 See id. at 35, 39-40.
258 See Pham, supra note 1, at 1399.
259 See id.
260 See id. at 1400.
261 See id.
262 See id.
263 See id.
264 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute that excluded illegal
immigrant children from enrolling in public schools).
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illegal immigrants as a whole. In doing so, it is appropriate to conclude
that it is in a state's best interest to prevent the development of an under-
privileged subclass, as many illegal immigrants will remain in the United
States and some may eventually become lawful residents or citizens.265
Therefore, the development of such a social class would only perpetuate
problems such as illiteracy, inevitably "adding to the problems and costs
of unemployment, welfare, and crime. '266 As a result, the perceived sav-
ings that may be attributed to stringent immigration laws are arguably
insubstantial in light of the potential long-term costs involved. 267
Many states also fear that local cooperation with federal immigra-
tion laws could result in illegal acts such as racial profiling. 268 Federal
Immigration Officers receive substantial training, including courses in
immigration and nationality law-training that far exceeds that of local
officers when it comes to immigration procedures. 269 A "lack of train-
ing, coupled with [a] lack of hands-on enforcement experience, may
tempt local authorities to rely on racial profiling and other prohibited
practices in enforcing immigration laws. '270 Such effects could be wors-
ened in communities where anti-immigrant sentiments exist. Under such
circumstances, these sentiments are more likely to be expressed by local
authorities. 271
Some states argue that required cooperation may interfere with the
state and local government's ability to conduct state functions. 272 In the
immigration context, the use of confidential material such as passports,
permanent resident cards, birth certificates, driver's licenses, ID cards,
and other forms of private documentation, is required. 273 The use of
confidential government information is not provided to local government
employees in their capacities as private citizens, but in their capacities as
local government officials. 274 Therefore, federal immigration laws may
intrude upon local government sovereignty, by inserting the federal gov-
ernment between local governments and their employees, requiring them
to obtain otherwise confidential and pertinent information, and by con-
trolling its use.275 As the Second Circuit recognized in City of New York
v. United States, "'[t]he obtaining of pertinent information, which is es-
sential to the performance of a wide variety of state and local govern-
265 See id. at 230.
266 Id.
267 See id.
268 See Pham, supra note 114, at 997.
269 See id.
270 Id.
271 See id.
272 See Pham, supra note 1, at 1403.
273 See supra notes 209-214 and accompanying text.
274 See Pham, supra note 1, at 1403.
275 See id.
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ment functions, may in some cases be difficult or impossible if some
expectation of confidentiality is not preserved.'1,276 The various pro-
posed policy considerations reflect the conflicts of interests presented to
states when confronted with the enforcement of federal immigration
laws.
On the other hand, more restrictive states, such as the state of Ari-
zona, reference other policy considerations. They argue on the grounds
of the unequal economic effects of illegal immigration. As this Note has
illustrated, illegal immigration has disparate effects across the nation,
with states such as Arizona experiencing a larger number of undocu-
mented aliens crossing their borders. 277 These numbers result in dispro-
portionate state-wide costs for public services which are not absorbed by
federal programs.278 Although both sides of the spectrum present con-
vincing policy arguments in support of the unilateral enactment of state
immigration laws, these arguments are substantially outweighed by con-
stitutional considerations, precedent, and the need for uniformity in im-
migration laws.
CONCLUSION
Through the enactment of LAWA, the state of Arizona is attempting
to address its concerns over the federal government's seemingly ineffec-
tive approach to curbing illegal immigration. However, its attempt to
regulate illegal immigration through LAWA exceeds its scope of author-
ity. Supreme Court precedent and constitutional provisions have undeni-
ably delegated the exclusive power to control immigration to the federal
government. Therefore, a state law, such as LAWA, to the extent that it
conflicts with federal immigration regulations, should be preempted by
federal law.
276 Id. (quoting City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999)).
277 See Spiro, supra note 127, at 125.
278 See id. at 125-27.
